Step One: Evaluate the Argument
- Identify the issue that is addressed in the argument.
- Explain the argument and identify the premises and conclusions.
- Evaluate the argument.
- If the argument has a deductive component, is it valid and sound? Why?
- If the argument has an inductive component, is it strong or weak? Why?
- Remember that arguments often contain both inductive and deductive components. Do your best to identify all the arguments that are used to support the position presented in the piece.
Step Two: Create a Counterargument
- Create a counterargument to the original argument.
- Present premises that support your own position while also pointing out the weaknesses inherent in the original argument. Avoid the use of fallacious reasoning and anecdotal evidence.
- If you are using inductive arguments, make sure that they are strong. If you are using deductive arguments, make sure that they are valid and attempt to provide sound premises.
- Use factual evidence and/or logical support from at least three scholarly sources to support your argument.
- This might require you to play “devil’s advocate.” Remember that you do not need to agree with the position for which you argue. You may need to take on an opposing position to your own personal view and argue from that position. Critical thinkers are able to take on opposing perspectives and identify the strongest arguments from those perspectives.
Choose one of the options below to present your argument evaluation and counterargument.
- Written Assignment
- Must be 1100 to 1400 words in length, excluding the title page and reference page(s).
- Must include at least three scholarly sources to support the counterargument.
- Must be formatted according to APA 6th edition style guidelines as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
- PowerPoint Presentation
- Must be 10 to 12 slides in length, excluding the title slide and reference slide(s). You must also include an audio voice-over transcript or slide notes totaling between 1100 and1400 words.
- The presentation, transcript, and/or slide notes must include APA-style references (in-text and on the reference slide) for at least three scholarly sources supporting the counter-argument.
- Must be formatted according to APA 6th edition style guidelines as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
- Feel free to use images that enhance the presentation and contribute to it. However, remember that images are not a substitute for the content that must be presented in slide notes or audio voice-over.
- Video Presentation using Present.me (https://present.me/content/)
- Must be five to ten minutes in length (no longer than ten minutes) and, include a voice-over component. At the beginning of the presentation, include the title page content listed below under the “Writing the Final Project” guidelines.
- Must provide a transcript of the video content that is between 1100 and 1400 words, including APA-style references (in-text and on the reference page(s)) to at least three academic sources supporting the counter-argument.
- Feel free to use images that enhance the presentation and contribute to it. However, remember that images are not a substitute for the content that must be presented in your audio voice-over.
- To submit your work, copy and paste the URL to your video into a Word document along with your transcript. Include your name and date, and submit the assignment using the Assignment Submission button in the online classroom.
- For help with using Present.me, use these resources.
- Present.me User Guide
- Your First Present.me Quick Start Video
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Writing the Final Project
The Final Project:
- Must be 1100 to 1400 words in length, and formatted according to APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
- Must include a title page/slide with the following:
- Title of project
- Student’s name
- Course name and number
- Instructor’s name
- Date submitted
- Must begin with an introduction that has a succinct thesis statement.
- Must address the topic of the project with critical thought.
- Must end with a conclusion that reaffirms your thesis.
- Must use at least three scholarly sources, including a minimum of three from the Ashford University Library.
- Must document all sources in APA 6th edition style, as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
- Must include a separate reference page/slide that is formatted according to APA style as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center.
Carefully review the Grading Rubric for the criteria that will be used to evaluate your assignment.
Late Policy: Written assignments (essays, journals, presentations) are due on the specified days in the course. Written assignments will be subject to a late penalty of up to 10% per day up to three days late. If written assignments are submitted after 72 hours past the due date, instructors can give a penalty up to and including a grade of 0 for the assignment.
PHI 103: Informal Logic Final Project Argument Options For your Final Project, you will select one of the arguments below to evaluate. You will also create a counterargument to the argument you choose. Refer to the Final Project instructions in the online classroom for details. Select the box of the argument of your choice to view the excerpt. Navigate back to the main screen by selecting “back to main.” All Animals are Equal by P. Singer Wealth of Nations Book I by A. Smith The Problems of Philosophy by B. Russell On Liberty By J. S. Mill Second Treatise of Government by J. Locke Alienated Labor By K. Marx Phaedo By Plato Applied Eugenics By P. Popenoe and R.H. Johnson In Defense of Traditional Marriage By R. Anderson The Case for Optimal Pollution By W. Baxter The Social Responsibility of Business By M. Friedman All Animals Are Equal Click here to access this argument: http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf APA Citation: Singer, P. (1989). All animals are equal. In T. Regan & P. Singer (Eds.) Animal rights and human obligations (pp. 148- 162) [Acrobat Reader version]. Retrieved from http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf All Animals Are Equal by P. Singer Back to Main Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature, which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given, or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man, or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion, but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to From The Wealth of Nations by A. Smith Back to Main them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion. As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison, with his companions; and he finds at last that he can, in this manner, get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent of genius he may possess for that particular species of business. The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came in to the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents. As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals, acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a grey-hound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd’s dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd’s dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men’s talents he has occasion for. APA Citation: Smith, A. (1776). Of the principle which gives occasion to the division of labour. In The wealth of nations (Book 1). Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300- h/3300-h.htm#link2HCH0002 On Our Knowledge of Universals We are all convinced that the sun will rise to-morrow. Why? Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience, or can it be justified as a reasonable belief? It is obvious that if we are asked why we believe that the sun will rise to-morrow, we shall naturally answer ‘Because it always has risen every day’. We have a firm belief that it will rise in the future, because it has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that it will continue to rise as heretofore, we may appeal to the laws of motion: the earth, we shall say, is a freely rotating body, and such bodies do not cease to rotate unless something interferes from outside, and there is nothing outside to interfere with the earth between now and to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted whether we are quite certain that there is nothing outside to interfere, but this is not the interesting doubt. The interesting doubt is as to whether the laws of motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is raised, we find ourselves in the same position as when the doubt about the sunrise was first raised. The only reason for believing that the laws of motion will remain in operation is that they have operated hitherto, so far as our knowledge of the past enables us to judge. It is true that we have a greater body of evidence from the past in favour of the laws of motion than we have in favour of the sunrise, because the sunrise is merely a particular case of fulfilment of the laws of motion, and there are countless other particular cases. But the real question is: Do any number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? If not, it becomes plain that we have no ground whatever for expecting the sun to rise to-morrow, or for expecting the bread we shall eat at our next meal not to poison us, or for any of the other scarcely conscious expectations that control our daily lives. It is to be observed that all such expectations are only probable; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they must be fulfilled, but only for some reason in favour of the view that they are likely to be fulfilled. The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if the earth came suddenly into contact with a large body which destroyed its rotation; but the laws of motion and the law of gravitation would not be infringed by such an event. The business of science is to find uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the law of gravitation, to which, so far as our experience extends, there are no exceptions. In this search science has been remarkably successful, and it may be conceded that such uniformities have held hitherto. This brings us From The Problems of Philosophy by B. Russell Back to Main back to the question: Have we any reason, assuming that they have always held in the past, to suppose that they will hold in the future? It must be conceded, to begin with, that the fact that two things have been found often together and never apart does not, by itself, suffice to prove demonstratively that they will be found together in the next case we examine. The most we can hope is that the oftener things are found together, the more probable it becomes that they will be found together another time, and that, if they have been found together often enough, the probability will amount almost to certainty. It can never quite reach certainty, because we know that in spite of frequent repetitions there sometimes is a failure at the last, as in the case of the chicken whose neck is wrung. Thus probability is all we ought to seek. It might be urged, as against the view we are advocating, that we know all natural phenomena to be subject to the reign of law, and that sometimes, on the basis of observation, we can see that only one law can possibly fit the facts of the case. Now to this view there are two answers. The first is that, even if some law which has no exceptions applies to our case, we can never, in practice, be sure that we have discovered that law and not one to which there are exceptions. The second is that the reign of law would seem to be itself only probable, and that our belief that it will hold in the future, or in unexamined cases in the past, is itself based upon the very principle we are examining. It should be noted that probability is always relative to certain data. In our case, the data are merely the known cases of coexistence of A and B. There may be other data, which might be taken into account, which would gravely alter the probability. For example, a man who had seen a great many white swans might argue, by our principle, that on the data it was probable that all swans were white, and this might be a perfectly sound argument. The argument is not disproved by the fact that some swans are black, because a thing may very well happen in spite of the fact that some data render it improbable. In the case of the swans, a man might know that colour is a very variable characteristic in many species of animals, and that, therefore, an induction as to colour is peculiarly liable to error. But this knowledge would be a fresh datum, by no means proving that the probability relatively to our previous data had been wrongly estimated. The fact, therefore, that things often fail to fulfil our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not probably be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is at any rate not capable of being disproved by an appeal to experience. The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the beliefs of daily life All such general principles are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed. APA Citation: Russell, B. (1912). On our knowledge of universals. In The problems of philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827- h.htm#link2HCH0012 Applications Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognise and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father’s duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognised, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent. Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battlefield for sects and parties, causing the time and labour which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State’s taking upon itself to direct that education; which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An From On Liberty by J.S. Mill Back to Main education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense. The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the state merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the state to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them. APA Citation: Mill, J.S. (1859). Applications. In On liberty. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm Of the State of War THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put From Second Treatise of Government by J. Locke Back to Main himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men’s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. APA Citation: Locke, J. (1689). Of the state of war. In Second treatise of government. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm Alienated Labor Click here to access this argument: http://www.yavanika.org/classes/reader/marx1.pdf Note: The highlighted portions of the argument will be particularly useful for this project. APA Citation: Marx, K. (1967). Alienated labor. From L. D. Easton & K. H. Guddat (Eds. & Trans.) Writings of the young Marx on philosophy and society (pp. 287-301). Retrieved from http://www.yavanika.org/classes/reader/marx1.pdf Alienated Labor by K. Marx Back to Main Abbreviated Version of Socrates Final Argument in Phaedo Socrates: I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul. Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this. Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can be beautiful only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty–and I should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause? Yes, he said, I agree. He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give, either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or to anyone who asks the question, I may safely reply, that by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me? I do. And that by greatness only great things become great and greater, and by smallness the less become less? True. … Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me:–There is a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold? Certainly. But are they the same as fire and snow? Most assuredly not. Heat is a thing different from fire, and cold is not the same with snow? Yes. From Phaedo by Plato Back to Main And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish? Very true, he replied. And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold. That is true, he said. … Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:–not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when it approaches them they either perish or withdraw. For example; will not the number three endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, while remaining three? Very true, said Cebes. … Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive? The soul, he replied. And is this always the case? Yes, he said, of course. Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life? Yes, certainly. And is there any opposite to life? There is, he said. And what is that? Death. Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings. Impossible, replied Cebes. And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even? The odd. And that principle which repels the musical, or the just? The unmusical, he said, and the unjust. And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death? The immortal, he said. And does the soul admit of death? No. Then the soul is immortal? Yes, he said. And may we say that this has been proven? Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable? Of course. And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat? True, he said. Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected? Certainly, he said. And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: ‘But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?’ Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing. Very true. And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given. No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish. Yes, all men, he said–that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men. Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable? Most certainly. Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound? True. Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world! APA Citation: Plato. (1689). Phaedo. Retrieved from http://fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedo.pdf Excerpt from the book Applied Eugenics written in 1918 by P. Popenoe and R. H. Johnson There are now in the United States some 14,000,000 foreign-born persons, together with other millions of the sons and daughters of foreigners who although born on American soil have as yet been little assimilated to Americanism. This great body of aliens, representing perhaps a fifth of the population, is not a pool to be absorbed, but a continuous, inflowing stream, which until the outbreak of the Great War was steadily increasing in volume, and of which the fountain-head is so inexhaustible as to appal the imagination. From the beginning of the century, the inflow averaged little less than a million a year, and while about one-fifth of this represented a temporary migration, four-fifths of it meant a permanent addition to the population of the New World. The character of this stream will inevitably determine to a large extent the future of the American nation. The direct biological results, in race mixture, are important enough, although not easy to define. The indirect results, which are probably of no less importance to eugenics, are so hard to follow that some students of the problem do not even realize their existence. The ancestors of all white Americans, of course, were immigrants not so very many generations ago. But the earlier immigration was relatively homogeneous and stringently selected by the dangers of the voyage, the hardships of life in a new country, and the equality of opportunity where free competition drove the unfit to the wall. There were few people of eminence in the families that came to colonize North America, but there was a high average of sturdy virtues, and a good deal of ability, particularly in the Puritan and Huguenot invasions and in a part of that of Virginia. In the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the number of these “patriots and founders” was greatly increased by the arrival of immigrants of similar racial stocks from Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia, and to a less extent from the other countries of northern and western Europe. These arrivals added strength to the United States, particularly as a large part of them settled on farms. This stream of immigration gradually dried up, but was succeeded by a flood from a new source,— southern and eastern Europe. Italians, Slavs, Poles, Magyars, East European Hebrews, Finns, Portuguese, Greeks, Roumanians and representatives of many other small nationalities began to seek fortunes in America. The earlier immigration had been made up largely of those who sought escape from religious or political tyranny and came to settle permanent homes. The newer immigration was made up, on the whole, of those who frankly sought wealth. The difference in the reason for coming could not fail to mean a difference in selection of the immigrants, quite apart from the change in the races. From Applied Eugenics by P. Popenoe and R.H. Johnson Back to Main Last of all began an immigration of Levantines, of Syrians, Armenians, and other inhabitants of Asiatic Turkey. Beyond this region lie the great nations of Asia, “oversaturated” with population. So far there has been little more than the threat of their overflow, but the threat is certain to become a reality within a few years unless prevented by legal restriction. The eugenic results of immigration are partly indirect and partly direct. Direct results follow if the newcomers are assimilated,—a word which we shall use rather narrowly to mean that free intermarriage takes place between them and all parts of the older population. We shall discuss the direct results first, the nature of which depends largely on whether the newcomers are racially homogeneous with the population already in the country. If they are like, the old and new will blend without difficulty. The effects of the immigration then depend on whether the immigrants are better or worse in average quality than the older residents. If as good or better, they are valuable additions; if inferior they are biologically a detriment. But if the new arrivals are different, if they represent a different subspecies of Homo sapiens, the question is more serious, for it involves the problem of crossing races which are biologically more or less distinct. Genetics can throw some light on this problem. Waiving for the moment all question as to the relative quality of two distinct races, what results are to be expected from crossing? It (1) gives an increase of vigor which diminishes in later generations and (2) produces recombination of characters. The first result may be disregarded, for the various races of man are probably already much mixed, and too closely related, to give rise to much hybrid vigor in crosses. The second result will be favorable or unfavorable, depending on the characters which go into the cross; and it is not possible to predict the result in human matings, because the various racial characters are so ill known. It is, therefore, not worth while here to discuss at length genetic theory. In general it may be said that some valuable characters are likely to disappear, as the result of such crosses, and less desirable ones to take their place. The great bulk of the population resulting from such racial crosses is likely to be more or less mongrel in nature. Finally, some individuals will appear who combine the good characters of the two races, without the bad ones. The net result will therefore probably be some distinct gain, but a greater loss. There is danger that complex and valuable traits of a race will be broken down in the process of hybridization, and that it will take a long time to bring them together again. The old view that racial crosses lead fatally to race degeneration is no longer tenable, but the view recently advanced, that crosses are advantageous, seems equally hasty. W. E. Castle has cited the Pitcairn Islanders and the Boer-Hottentot mulattoes of South Africa as evidence that wide crosses are productive of no evil results. These cases may be admitted to show that such a hybrid race may be physically healthy, but in respect of mental traits they hardly do more than suggest the conclusion we advanced in our chapter on the Color Line, that such miscegenation is an advantage to the inferior race and a disadvantage to the superior one. On the whole, we believe wide racial crosses should be looked upon with suspicion by eugenists. The colonizers of North America mostly belonged to the Nordic race. The earlier immigrants to the United States,—roughly, those who came here before the Civil War,—belonged mostly to the same stock, and therefore mixed with the early settlers without difficulty. The advantages of this immigration were offset by no impairment of racial homogeneity. But the more recent immigration belongs mostly to other races, principally the Mediterranean and Alpine. Even if these immigrants were superior on the average to the older population, it is clear that their assimilation would not be an unmixed blessing, for the evil of crossbreeding would partly offset the advantage of the addition of valuable new traits. If, on the other hand, the average of the new immigration is inferior in quality, or in so far as it is inferior in quality, it is evident that it must represent biologically an almost unmixed evil; it not only brings in new undesirable traits, but injures the desirable ones already here. APA Citation: Popenoe, P., & Johnson, R.H. (1918). Applied eugenics. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19560/19560-h/19560-h.htm#Page_368 In Defense of Traditional Marriage Click here to access the argument: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/in-defense-of-traditionalmarriage/2013/03/20/d19a0c08-915a-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html APA Citation: Anderson, R. T. (2013, March 20). In defense of traditional marriage. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/in-defense-oftraditional-marriage/2013/03/20/d19a0c08-915a-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html In Defense of Traditional Marriage by R. Anderson Back to Main The Case for Optimal Pollution Click here to access the argument: http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Env_Ethics_Sp_2012/Baxter_Case_for_Optimal_Pollution.pdf APA Citation: Baxter, W. (n.d.). The case for optimal pollution. Retrieved from http://hettingern.people.cofc.edu/Env_Ethics_Sp_2012/Baxter_Case_for_Optimal_Poll ution.pdf The Social Responsibility of Business Click here to access the argument: http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-respbusiness.html APA Citation: Friedman, M. (1970, September 13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html The Case for Optimal Pollution by W. Baxter Back to Main The Social Responsibility of Business by M. Friedman Back to Main